A Panorama of Turkey’s Migration Regime with an Emphasis on the Prospects of Turkish Immigration to the EU on the Eve of the Membership Negotiations

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1. Introduction

In connection with the migration issue and its impacts on the labour market, European countries attempt to address the following questions in general:

- What are the recent trends in labour migration in advanced European countries?
- What are the dynamics and prospects of high-skill labour migration?
- What are the possible economic and social impacts of increased emigration from the acceding countries?
- How quickly will citizens from the acceding countries be entitled to take up jobs in the EU countries? How much inflow will this trigger?
- How is the introduction scale of foreign labour determined?
- What are the administrative structures of organisations in charge of labour migration policy and its enforcement?
- How have the mechanisms to utilise necessary foreign workforce been developed and what programs are currently used? and so on.

In addition, free movement of labour is encouraged and guaranteed among European Union (EU) member states; thus workers of EU member states enjoy a right to seek employment in other EU member states, a right to move to other EU member states for the purpose of employment, a right to reside in other member states for the purpose of employment, and a right to remain in other EU countries after the termination of employment if the household is financially self-supporting.

However, these questions are yet far from being on the agenda of Turkey, which is to deal not only with the complex nature of the migration problem but also with the structural labour market issues. Besides, recent trend in Europe in terms of the free movement of labour seems to be one of the most controversial and debated issues in terms of the discussions of Turkey’s accession to the EU membership. On 17 December 2004, the EU decided to start negotiations for accession with Turkey, and one of the hot issues within this framework is the prospect of Turkish immigration to the EU.
In this panoramic presentation I would like to stress on some possible outcomes of Turkey’s integration with the EU with an emphasis on the issue of immigration, but before starting I would like to give a picture of the Turkish economy and an overview of various aspects of migration and developments which constitute a background for Turkey’s migration regime.

2. Demographic, social and economical trends in Turkey

According to the General Census, Turkey’s population stood at 67.8 million in 2000 and this number is estimated as being 70 million 655 thousand in 2004. Roughly two thirds of the population (65 percent) live in urban locations with 20,000 or more inhabitants. Between 1990 and 2000 the population grew at an average annual rate of 1.83 percent. The growth rate was 2.68 percent in urban areas and only 0.42 percent in rural areas. The large difference between the two is attributable to rural-to-urban migration.

Most recent predictions indicate that the population of Turkey would stabilise somewhere between 95 and 98 million by the middle of the 21st century. Examination of the evolution of the age structure of the population in 1990 and beyond reveals a dramatic rise (from 44 to 52 percent by 2010) in the share of individuals between the ages of 20 and 54. The equally dramatic fall (from 35 to 26 percent) in the share of the youth (0-14), combined with the increasing (from 4 to 6 percent) but still small share of the elderly (65 and over), point at a favourable dependency profile. (İnsan Tunalı, s.94)

Table 1. Annual rate of population growth in Turkey (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000-10</th>
<th>2010-20</th>
<th>2020-30</th>
<th>2030-40</th>
<th>2040-50</th>
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<tr>
<td>0 – 14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
<td>-0.99</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 – 64</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>65 +</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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Source: SPO

After suffering its worst economic crisis in modern times in 2001 when it registered a minus-7.4 percent real GDP growth rate (68.5 percent year-end consumer inflation, $145 billion GDP), Turkey has recovered in 2002 with GDP growing by 7.8 percent (29.7 percent inflation, $183 billion GDP). The growth rate was 18.4 in 2003 and 9.32 in 2004. After suffering a hyper-inflation in 1980s and 90s, annual consumer inflation for 2003 was 18.4 percent and Turkey registered a single digit annual inflation figure for 2004, for the first time since the mid-1970s. However, the recovery seen in growth rates in 2003 does not mean that consumption levels registered a jump. 2000, 2002, and 2003 real consumption levels are quite close to each other. In addition, the unemployment rate did not come down and real wages have not gone up.

In addition, I would like to stress on the projections of GNP Growth Rates as the largest item of revenue in the EU budget is the GNP contribution by member states. The item in
question forms about half the EU budget. Table 2 gives projections of GDP growth rates for Turkey and the EU-25. As will be seen from the Table, the GNP growth rate of Turkey is above the average growth rate of the EU-25 over the years. As a result, Turkey’s GNP contribution to the EU budget would increase more every year in comparison with the other countries.

Table 2. GNP Growth Rates (percent)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPO

The Justice and Development Party, AKP, is currently ruling with a large parliamentary majority. As the government and the public have observed the recovery in mid-2003, the AKP has eagerly adopted the ‘IMF - Central Bank’ stabilisation program. The economy is now under strict control of IMF and a new financial crisis is not imminent.

Here, it should be noted that the economical recovery observed after the 2001 crisis has been a jobless recovery. The unemployment rate is steady at around 11 percent. There are several reasons for this.

Firstly, construction employment that currently stands at 8 percent of total employment (normally 10 percent, 12 percent in good times) is crucially dependent on public spending on infrastructure projects. Turkey still commits to a target of 6.5 percent public-sector primary surplus (budget balance less interest payments on debt) and as result there will be no investment expenditure growth.
Secondly, the independent Central Bank, which is steadfast in its inflation target, will not ease up its monetary policy. The government’s fiscal policy is tied in with these targets, so pay rises for public sector workers, which are mirrored in the private sector, are to match the target inflation rate. Thus, real wage losses will continue. Turkish growth components in 2003 and 2004 were recovering consumption, business inventories, and exports. Consumption-led growth will still be suppressed for a while lest inflation picks up again.

Thirdly, productivity has increased and this development sends out positive signals for the economy in the medium term. Turkey has started to benefit from these trends at the end of 2004 and in 2005. However, Turkish employers adapted and learned through the crises to make do with fewer workers. This will not help employment in the interim period. Many of the mostly unskilled workers who have lost their jobs in the recent past remains unemployable. More recently, skill requirements may have begun to go up in Turkish firms. However, the share of the working age population above 15 within the general population is still high above the labour force demand and this is one of the main reasons indicating why the recovery did not bring a solution to unemployment.

Fourthly, as the recovery progresses, unskilled agricultural workers are increasingly migrating to urban areas. The pace of out-migration from rural areas will determine the labour-force participation rates and unemployment rates in the Turkish economy for some time to come. Unemployment is expected to remain the major problem of the Turkish economy, despite the recovery.

This being the demographic and economic picture, the government now faces various challenges such as achieving and securing a sustainable growth without inflation, servicing of an external debt stock that has reached $120 billion. The weakened financial and banking sector and a real sector that has ground to a halt are looking for innovative policy initiatives that can restore confidence. With 2.8 million unemployed individuals nationwide (as of the first quarter of 2003), unemployment rates that hover around 30 percent for the educated youth (15-24 year olds with high school and university diplomas) residing in urban areas, and urban labour force participation rates dipping under 45 percent, employment problems loom large. Historically subsidies to small farms have helped sustain a large rural workforce and kept urban unemployment at bay. With the removal of the subsidies, a new challenge has emerged: How to keep rural-urban migration and urban unemployment under check. On the political front, the government has to deal with regional issues and the reform expectations of the EU. (İnsan Tunali, S.30)

Although the gradient has flattened considerably, the labour force participation rates (LFPRs) in Turkey are still on the declining trend that began in the 1950s. There is strong evidence that the decline in labour force participation has gone hand in hand with rural-urban migration induced urbanisation. To a large extent this pattern has to do with the different conditions that households face in the respective locations. Simply put, in rural areas it is a lot easier for men and women to satisfy the criteria used for identifying participants: Firstly because of the dominant role of agriculture, and secondly because of...
the overlap in the work and home environments of agricultural households. Consequently all members participate in household based production activities. Households which migrate to urban areas have difficulty maintaining the continuity between the domains of market and non-market production, and members specialise further in one or the other of these activities. The form that this specialisation takes is dictated by traditional forces, which charge men with the responsibility of bringing home the bread, and women with the task of maintaining the home and child rearing. Increased educational opportunities allow children to stay in school longer, and result in reduced teen participation rates. Finally, skill requirements of jobs in urban areas induce selective participation.

Data collected by İŞKUR indicates three patterns in terms of Labour Force Participation of population: (i) Rural LFPRs are higher than urban LFPRs; (ii) male LFPRs are higher than female LFPRs; and (iii) the male-female differential is higher in urban areas than in rural areas.

4. Geographic Mobility

Information concerning “migration” in general and its effects on the labour market in particular is limited in Turkey due to lack of proper data collecting systems on this subject. In this regard, the main source of information is the State Institute of Statistics, which has recently started a project titled “Med-Migration Project” with the long-term objective to increase the general awareness level of other related institutions for setting up a statistical system to establish a database on international migration and to improve the quality of analytical studies on international migration in Turkey. State Institute of Statistics also collects information about the migration of people between localities in Turkey, the migration of people coming to Turkey from other countries, and the reasons of migration in compliance with United Nations standards. Studies about the migrating population and the migration map are being held by SIS. Apart from this, Hacettepe University and various state organisations, including the Turkish Employment Organisation and the State Planning Organisation, collect information within this framework. However, these data fail to provide a full picture of Turkey’s migration regime, and various steps should be taken for improving the data collection system which will pave the way for proper and effective policies to be developed for taking action against the problems of migration while enjoying its advantages.

Broadly speaking, the east-to-west, and rural-to-urban migration flows which first emerged in the 50s are still in effect. Between 1985 and 1990 net outflows were recorded from the North (Black Sea, 19.9 out-migrants per 1000), East and Southeast (17), and Central (5.8) regions. Net inflows were recorded into the West (Marmara and Aegean combined, 18.2 in-migrants per 1000), and the South (8.5). Peak rates were observed between ages 15-19 for males, 20-24 for females.

The differences between the countrywide averages (of the population growth rate) and the individual figures for regions and provinces suggest that the general contours of the internal migration process have not been altered. İstanbul boasted a growth rate of 3.31 percent, and was home to 15 percent of Turkey’s population in 2000. Two provinces registered even faster growth, Antalya in the south-west at 4.18 percent, and Şanlıurfa in the south-east at 3.66 percent. While 66 provinces registered increases, 15 had declines in population. With one exception, the provinces that registered declines are in the Black Sea, South Eastern
and Eastern regions. Marmara region grew fastest (at 2.67 percent) and the Black Sea region slowest (at 0.36 percent). (İnsan Tunali, s.43)

Mainly as a result of migration to urban areas, the rural labour force dropped from 11.4 million in 1990 to just under 10 million in 2000, and continued to shrink in 2001. Over seventy percent of the rural workforce was employed in agriculture in 2001. Due to weaker qualifications needed for employment, rural residents are less likely to be unemployed. While women have traditionally been economically active in family-owned farms, young men have sought work outside agriculture to supplement farming income. Starting with 1999 the cuts in agricultural subsidies and competition from imports appear to have put more pressure on men to seek for jobs. (İnsan Tunali, s.46)

4.1. Migration and Internally Displaced Persons

In addition to the migration due to economic reasons, Turkey has been facing the problem of “internally displaced persons” due to the armed conflict with the PKK. According to the international definition, “internally displaced persons” are persons or group of persons who involuntarily left their home or habitual settlements especially as a result of or in order to protect themselves from the consequences of armed conflict, in general, any condition including violence, the violation of human rights or the natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised state border (Source: United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement). During the last 20 years in Turkey, especially in East and South East Anatolia, many villages and fields have been evacuated as a result of internal armed conflicts. According to the data provided by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, by the end of the January 2005, the number of the people who have been displaced as a result of internal armed conflicts in the 12 provinces (Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van) in East and South East Anatolia was 357,000. Turkish government started the “Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project” intended for this group of population. The number of people who have returned as part of this project is about 127,000.

On the other hand, some international organisations declare the number of mentioned population between 1 and 4.5 million. In addition to different numbers expressed by Turkish government and Non-Governmental Organisations, there are criticisms concerning the low number of people returned as part of “Return to Villages and Rehabilitation Project”, the current security problems in the region, the critiques related to existence of village guards as a barrier for the return, non-participatory nature of the project and the possibility of recent compensation law’s not responding the actual needs of internally displaced persons.

The exact number of internally displaced persons is still unknown. However, it is necessary to define the scale of the problem so as to develop proper solutions, including the necessary labour market measures. To this end, Hacettepe University of Population Studies (HIPS) in Ankara has designed a detailed study with the aim to develop a model or models concerning the sustainability and rehabilitation of the settlements which are suitable for return migration and the development of policies and precautions in order to make the population who were subject to and drastically experienced the problems of the displacement productive for themselves and for the
country and to collect the information related to the origin of displaced persons, their
destinations, the quality and quantity of the displaced persons before and after the
displacement in order to help the preparation of the plans that will be implemented
towards selected rural settlements.

In this project, information will be collected in detail on 1) the population migrated
from the mentioned provinces, 2) socio-economic and demographic characteristics of
the internally displaced persons (who are defined above), 3) sub-group population of
the internally displaced persons who left the villages/settlements they were living in
as a result of armed conflict in about last 20 years. The information on this sub-group
including both the persons who returned to their villages and the persons who did not
and continue their lives in cities will be collected. Moreover, special emphasis will be
given to include both sexes to be represented as well as different age groups to be
covered during the interviews with the internally displaced persons.

This study will be concluded in the beginning of 2006. In the final report, there will be
policy suggestions related to return, settlements and integration of the internally
displaced persons and return migrants. Moreover, there will also be policy
suggestions on the existence and sustainability of regional development policies and
for diminishing the development gap between regions.

5. External mobility

Information on external mobility is extremely limited (mainly because there is no system of
data collection). Although Turkey saw an influx of refugees from northern Iraq during the
1991 Gulf War (put at 500,000 in newspaper articles), it is difficult to establish whether the
flow was transitional, and how it may have impacted regional balances. News of illegal
immigrants caught in Turkey, and competition from undocumented workers in day jobs,
have frequently appeared in newspapers in recent years. One thing is clear: Legal
emigration from Turkey is down to a trickle compared to the flows in the 60s. According to
İŞKUR, less than 10,000 workers went abroad in 2001, and about 15,000 halfway through
2002. Largest flows recorded in 2002 were to Saudi Arabia, Russian Federation, and
Germany.

gives a detailed picture of trends in migration flows and changes in the foreign population in
Turkey. According to this report, four main types of foreign inflows have developed in
1990s, in addition to the traditional migration of Turkish citizens, which is also often a form
of asylum seeking. These comprise asylum seekers and refugees, transit migration flows,
illegal labour migration and the legal migration of foreigners. According to the OECD report,
the first three types of inflows often overlap, although their numbers are hard to estimate.
Apart from this, several categories of emigration flows exist, including family-related
emigration, asylum seekers, illegal emigrants and project-tied labour emigration. A
relatively new source of emigration is that by highly-skilled Turkish workers, especially in
computing, finance and management (around 2,000-3,000). Overall, the total number of
expatriate Turks is put at 3.6 million (with nearly 3 million in the EU15), or 5.4% of Turkey’s
total population. According to the OECD report, there is some evidence that the recent
trend has been slightly downward as Turks have naturalised in their adopted countries or
returned home.
As to the illegal migration, OECD report reads that unsupported estimates have indicated the presence of around one million illegal foreign workers in Turkey, although more cautious estimates put the figure at 150-200,000. Accordingly, domestic work and the entertainment sector are the largest employers of illegal female workers, construction and agriculture for males.

At this point, the number of the illegal immigrants caught by the Turkish security forces may give an idea about the scale of this problem. According to the figures given by the Ministry of Interior, the number of illegal immigrants captured by the Turkish authorities between 1995 and March 2003 amounts to a total of 418,977, with an increasing pace over these years.

5.1. A special emphasis: Human Trafficking

Expansion of the irregular international migration movements, was unfortunately followed by one of the very global threats to human dignity, i.e. human trafficking. This phenomenon evolved into a commonly observed form of human rights abuses, which has wide ranging impact both in terms of its scope and victims. The experience that is shared by many refers to the very fact that human trafficking activities have been a concern to a wide range of countries. The evidence also points that women and children are becoming primary targets of human traffickers. The activities regarding this issue are driven by underground networks, often bearing an international nature, and that they generally go hand in hand with domestic and international organised crime rings.

In the face of gravity of the problem, Turkey, a country situated at the crossroads of Asia, Middle East and Europe, bordering eight countries, and lapped by 5,000 miles of coastline, has been seriously confronted with various forms of transnational organised crime, posing a threat to its social order, as well as human and democratic values.

In recent years, Turkey has become a country of destination for human trafficking, and it is also a transit country. Unlike other European countries, flexible visa and travel regulations in Turkey enable foreigners to enter the country easily on individual basis, without particular assistance from organised groups or agencies. Countries that are surrounding Turkey from the North to the North-East are generally accepted as countries of origin. Nationals of these countries may enter Turkey by a visa obtained at the ports of entry and they can stay in Turkey up to one month. Their purpose is two-fold. The first and the foremost is the “luggage trade”. The second purpose is to find employment regardless of the work conditions. While their presence in Turkey is mainly voluntary, the work they hold illegally and their vulnerable status, nevertheless, make them susceptible to exploitation. Some of them acquire Turkish citizenship through arranged marriages and obtain legal residency in Turkey. Some others end up in small workshops, or in private households, working illegally without any job security, insurance or administrative and judicial safeguards. Those who are employed in tourism and entertainment sector may become vulnerable to further exploitation and trafficking.
Considering the human trafficking as a serious threat to human dignity, Turkey has started to introduce certain reforms for fighting against human trafficking and illegal migration, within the general framework of the ongoing legal reform process. In addition to many longstanding international instruments dealing with "white slave trade" and trafficking in "women and children", Turkey is a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On 9 May 2002, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Besides, Turkey is among the initial signatories of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and of its two additional Protocols including the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking, especially women and children. The said Convention and its additional protocols have been approved by the Turkish Parliament on 18 May 2003. By adopting these international instruments Turkey clearly indicates her political will to combat against trafficking in human beings in all aspects in close co-operation with the world community and commits herself to translate the provisions included therein into its own legislation. In fulfilment of the provisions of the UN Conventions Against Transnational Organised Crime and its additional protocols, an amendment to Article 201 of the Penal Code and an amendment to the law on Combating Benefits-Orientated Criminal Organisations have been prepared by the Ministry of Justice and were adopted by the Parliament on 3 August 2002. In conformity with the Palermo Protocol Against Trafficking in Persons, this law among its other provisions, introduces the definition of the trafficking in human beings into Turkish legal system and prescribes serious penalties that are increased with aggravating circumstances to prohibit trafficking in persons. As mentioned briefly above, a new Penal Code is under discussion currently. The new law is expected to include some specific articles addressing the issue of trafficking in women and children. Most recent legislative arrangement was made to prevent illegal working in private households through changing the Code on Work Permits for Foreigners to enable foreigners to take on domestic work, on 6 September 2003. Thus illegal working which causes susceptibility to exploitation is addressed in regard to work in private households. Legislative process has been initiated to make changes in the law to enable victims of trafficking to be treated free of charge at state hospitals. The National Task Force on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings has been formed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is also the National Co-ordinator in this issue. The National Task Force consists of officials from the relevant state institutions. As a result of the work of the said National Task Force, a draft National Action Plan on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings has been prepared and finalised. There are various additional measures taken in that regard both in legal, administrative and educational spheres such as training and public awareness activities to ensure provision of social, physical and psychological rehabilitation of the victims of trafficking. At the international level, Turkey actively supports counter-trafficking efforts and activities of the OSCE and the Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings and adheres to the norms and standards developed for the prevention of trafficking, the prosecution of traffickers, and the protection of victims. Turkey also co-operates with UNHCR, IOM, SECI, and EUROPOL in these areas.¹

5.2. A special emphasis: The Euro-Turkish Context

The movement of Turkish citizens to fill in the gaps in the labour markets of the rapidly developing Western European countries has started in the early 1960s and continued until 1974. Since then, Turkish workforce started to move towards North Africa, Middle East, Gulf countries, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, towards Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. This change may be explained by the further opening of the Turkish economy to the world and the undertaking of huge infrastructure projects by Turkish contractors in those regions.

Migration flows from Turkey to Europe have been shaped by regulations and changes in socio-economic regimes and migratory regimes in Turkey and Western Europe. The migration from Turkey is better understood in five phases starting from the early 1960s.

Labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe was unleashed in 1961 through bilateral agreements with Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Similar agreements were later made with Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium in 1964, France in 1967, Australia in 1968, Switzerland in 1971, Denmark in 1973, and Norway in 1981. During these fifteen years, more than one million and a half Turkish citizens migrated into Europe (Abadan-Unat 1995). Originally, the common goal of the Turkish "guest workers" was to save enough money to open up a small shop or to invest on the plot of land already in their possessions thus enabling these workers one day to come back home to start a business of their own. With this in mind, it was no surprise that most of these "guest workers" went alone to their destinations leaving their families back home.

The massive labour migration from Turkey to Western Europe stagnated in the mid-1970s due to global energy crisis while in the second half of the 1970s, family migrations dominated the flows to Europe and contract labour migrations from Turkey to Arab countries started.

The third phase of migration from Turkey can be marked with the beginning of massive asylum flows in the early 1980s due to the military intervention in Turkey on September 12, 1980. Those who suffered from the oppression of the military government who imposed an emergency rule in the country that lasted for more than twenty years in some areas. By the end of this period the Turkish immigrant stock in Western Europe had reached the level of three millions.

The fourth interval was that of transition characterised by rare labour migrations, steady family reunification migrations, and voluminous Turkish Kurdish asylum migrations. This period lasted from the late1980s until the mid-1990s (Sirkeci 2002).

The last period involves a flow of Kurdish asylum seekers to Europe due to the ethnic conflict in Turkey during the 1990s. In this phase of Euro-Turkish context, period, which was generated by the armed clashes in Southeast Turkey during the last two decades, Western Europe witness massive flows of Kurdish migrants who fled Turkey and Iraq and arrived at the shores of Greece and Italy heading towards the North Western industrialised countries such as the UK. This development led Europe
to tighten European migration policies. As long as the legal doors of entry into Europe are closed illegal strategies became prevalent.

One of the main debates within the Euro-Turkish context is the problem of integration. Many in Europe believe that large numbers of Turkish immigrants have failed to integrate into their host communities. This is seen as a factor that has exacerbated anti-immigrant feelings in a number of EU member countries and fuels concerns about further immigration. At the same time, there are also those who recognise that many Turkish nationals have actually integrated well and even joined the ranks of elected politicians at the local and national levels as well as being elected to the European Parliament. In the economic field, the status of many Turks has already or is gradually evolving from a status of a simple worker to a self-employed status. Furthermore, they are gradually becoming employers. Just to give an example, the number of Turkish businesses set up in Germany alone has exceeded 59,000. These businesses have created job opportunities for around 330,000 persons in Germany. Nevertheless, there are many in Europe who continue to complain about the failure of an important section of the Turkish immigrant community to integrate into their host societies. There are even claims that their integration often lags behind that of the North Africans. The complaints include poor educational performance, high levels of unemployment, alienation from the larger society, isolation of the women not to mention of course honour killings and forced marriages. The resentment toward Turkish immigrants has become particularly aggravated since 9/11 and the accompanying increase in Islamic fundamentalist terrorism. This naturally is fuelling xenophobia and anti-immigrant feelings in Europe undermining values that are normally associated with European integration. Coming at a time when there is general public discomfort with the current enlargement process, there are concerns that this problem may adversely affect Turkey’s prospects of accession to the EU.

This picture may be partly true, but it only reflects part of the picture, in fact the empty part of the proverbial glass. There is also a need to recognise that all members of an immigrant society are not going to integrate at the same pace and in a linear fashion. There are large numbers of immigrants to Turkey that have actually integrated into the ranks of their host communities. Among them are individuals that have reached important positions in their host societies. An increasing number of Turks are getting elected to local as well as national parliaments. On the other hand, there are also large numbers of Turks who are indeed failing to integrate. Integration is a complicated process and distinguishing integration from assimilation can become difficult and is far too subtle a distinction for the average observer to make. European societies are still debating the issue, yet education, employment, political rights and improvement of social and judicial status, as well as racism and xenophobia are still main issues of concern for Turks living abroad.

Undoubtedly, some of the measures adopted impact favourably on integration while others complicate it. Granting citizenship and political rights seems to facilitate integration. On the other hand, measures that emphasise the temporary nature of the presence of immigrants in a host society or measures that are perceived as assimilationist or discriminatory aggravate it. A case in point is the emphasis put on encouraging immigrants to return to their home countries when the Christian Democrats came to power in the mid-1970s in Germany, in contrast to Social
Democrat policies that were more willing to recognise that immigrants were not simply guest workers certain to return one day. Just as some of the host countries refused to accept that these guest workers were there to stay, until very lately the Turkish government too based its policies on the idea that these people one day would actually return to Turkey and hence until very, very recently did not consider policies that could help integration. Currently, various Turkish agencies such as the Ministry of Education and the Directorate for Religious Affairs are introducing programs to encourage their personnel who are sent to serve in Europe to learn local languages in an effort to assist the integration of the immigrants they serve.

Integration cannot be a one-way street. There is a growing recognition that just as immigrants have to make an effort to integrate, host governments have to adopt policies to help their integration. Yet, this in itself is not enough either. The host society has to change and adapt too by reconsidering attitudes and perceptions which border on xenophobia if not outright racism. It is not good to adopt integrationist policies while the society’s expectations from such policies are that immigrants will simply become like them, in other words assimilate. The notion of integration has to be much better understood and much better explained to host societies. Integration is inevitably about adopting common universal values while some of the cultural rituals and characteristics of immigrants can continue to be observed. Individuals in the long run are going to define themselves in relation to how the larger society defines them. Constant discrimination and constant exclusion is inevitably going to complicate integration. Hence increasingly host governments have to adopt policies that help integrate immigrants but also help local people adjust their expectations in favour of integration as opposed to outright assimilation. Furthermore, the governments of countries of origin, as well as civil societies, have to be more involved in the process. Hence, the process of integration and the notion itself is a difficult one. It is very important to try to understand these processes first rather than to simply characterise the situation as a “defect” with respect to integration of immigrants from Turkey on the basis of religion or ethnicity.

6. A Hot Debate: Prospects of Turkish Immigration to the EU within the frame of Turkey’s possible membership to the EU

After 17 December 2004, the date when the EU decided to start negotiations for accession with Turkey, one of the hotly contested issues has become the prospect of Turkish immigration to the EU. Many Europeans believe that there would be an inflow of Turks immigrating to EU in large numbers if Turkey is to become an EU member state. It is estimated that there are approximately 3,6 million Turkish nationals living abroad of which about 3 to 3,2 million are in European countries. Some studies predict a flow of migrants (between 1.3 to 2.7 million) from Turkey to the EU until 2030.

This fear is coupled with the widespread belief in Europe that Turkish immigrants have failed to integrate into their host communities. This perception has exacerbated anti-immigrant feelings in a number of EU member countries and fuels concerns about further immigration. This debate does not recognise the fact that Turkey itself has always been a country of immigration receiving a large number of permanent and transitory immigrants and refugees. A Turkey that is actively engaged by the EU for eventual membership will most likely emulate the experience of Spain, Portugal and Greece in that it would attract
immigrants that otherwise could be going to Western Europe. Besides, a Turkey with a predominantly young population and with nearly half its total workforce having received higher education would provide important contributions to the labour market in the EU after accession. In this regard, it is a known fact that the increase of the elderly population in all European countries in the 2000s and the reduced participation of the young population in the labour markets will result in a considerable shortage of skilled personnel in the member states, where employment is concentrated in production involving the use of high technology. Turkey holds an important potential to fill the deficit of skilled labour for the EU in the coming period. Given the importance of the EU as an anchor in Turkish politics and for the economy, it is quite likely that migration might be greater and of a more difficult sort if the prospects of membership is lost.

6.1. The Contribution of Turkey’s Young and Educated Population to the EU Economy

The size of Turkey’s population is a subject of criticisms, which may be regarded as reasonable to a certain extent, in some circles. However, when one considers the composition of this population and its relationship with the needs of the EU in a dynamic process, it will be possible to make very different assessments.

In this context, the positive developments achieved in the Turkish education system in recent years are expected to continue in the future. In the context of efforts for alignment with the EU education system, the period of primary education in Turkey has been raised from five to eight years. Work is underway to raise the compulsory education period to 12 years in the near future.

As is reflected in Figure 2 below, the rate of literacy, which was 78.3 percent for women and 94.5 percent for men in 2000, is expected to be 100 percent for women and men in 2020.

Figure 2. Rates of literacy (percent)

During the period 2000-2004, an increase (25 percent) has been observed in the number of students of secondary vocational and technical education institutions. In addition, in the
same period, with the regulation providing entrance to vocational colleges from vocational high schools without examination, the number of students of vocational colleges rose significantly (40 percent). As can be seen from Table 5, the weight of the vocational and technical schools in the education system is expected to rise.

Table 5. Schooling rates in secondary education (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Education</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- General Secondary Education</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Vocational and Technical</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPO

Another important indicator of the increase in the education level and quality in Turkey, and therefore in the educated workforce, is the number of students in universities and colleges. Looking at the schooling rates in higher education in Table 6, it was 29 percent in 2000 and it is estimated to rise to 49.5 percent in 2020. These figures exclude graduate education but include extended education.

Table 6. Schooling rates in higher education (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SPO

*Graduate education excluded but extended education included.

One of the most important indicators of the increasing quality of the workforce is the share of the workforce that has received higher education in the total workforce, which is rapidly increasing in Turkey. Examining the share of the workforce that has received higher education in the total workforce in Figure 3 below, it is expected that this share, which stood at 8.8 percent in 2000, will rise to 17.9 percent in 2020. A Turkey with a predominantly young population and with nearly half its total workforce having received higher education would provide important contributions to the labour market in the EU after accession.
In parallel to economic development in Turkey, the structure of the labour market is also changing. As can be seen in Table 7, the distribution of employment by sector is developing in favour of industry and services.

Table 7. Development of sectoral shares in employment (percent)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In demographic terms, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) studies on current and future demographic trends point out that in the coming period the economies of Western Europe will need more employees at every skill level in many sectors.

While flexible labour markets prepare the ground for increased migration of temporary labour, important developments in certain areas such as information technology increase the demand for skilled labour in those areas. Germany is a good case in point. To meet the need for skilled personnel in the area of information and communications technology in the labour market, this country has recently requested about 20,000 experts from non-EU member states in particular.

Demographic factors may have important effects on migration flows. Many experts and social scientists working on EU social policies point out that the shortage of skilled labour,
starting in the 1980s, will be the basic factor affecting the labour markets in Europe. It is a known fact that the increase of the elderly population in all European countries in the 2000s and the reduced participation of the young population in the labour markets will result in a considerable shortage of skilled personnel in the member states, where employment is concentrated in production involving the use of high technology. Turkey holds an important potential to fill the deficit of skilled labour for the EU in the coming period.

Table 8. Breakdown of Population by Age Group 1990-2070* (1000)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-14</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-64</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>67.420</td>
<td>72.295</td>
<td>77.004</td>
<td>81.334</td>
<td>85.392</td>
<td>89.156</td>
<td>92.238</td>
<td>96.222</td>
<td>97.299</td>
<td>95.990</td>
<td>93.292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. includes the long-term population projection for Turkey by age groups. As can be seen there, 64.6 percent of the population is included between the ages of 15 and 64 according to the figures for 2000. The age group of 0 to 14 constitutes 30.5 percent of the population. According to Eurostat figures, this ratio is 16 percent for the EU-15. While it falls to 12.5 percent for the EU-15 in 2020, it will be 23 percent in Turkey. This means that Turkey with its young population could provide major contributions for the ageing Europe, because the current trend means that a smaller number of working people will have to support a greater number of retired people. On the other hand, looking at the long-term projection of the population, it is estimated that in the 2050s the population will stop rising and begin to decline. Therefore, Turkey with its growing population is far from being a threat for Europe. On the contrary, it would provide a contribution through its rising young population.

6.2. Prospects of Turkish Immigration to the EU

The large size of Turkey’s population and the concern that migration on a large scale would take place from Turkey to the EU after accession is an argument that is frequently put forward against Turkey’s membership of the EU. There are even those who speak of Turks “flooding” Western Europe when membership is granted and free movement of labour is allowed. The numbers being bantered about range from 2.5 million to 10 and even 15 million. A column in the Belgian paper, De Standard (30 March 2004) written by Dirk Jacob Niewboer, argued that 25 percent of Turks, roughly 17 million, would migrate to Europe if they could.

More serious studies predict a flow of migrants from Turkey to the EU of between 1.3 to 2.7 million until 2030. A key input in any such prediction is the long-term growth scenario in

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the EU and more particularly in Turkey. Currently Turkey's purchasing power in adjusted GNP per capita is about 30 percent of that in the EU 15. A key question in making predictions is how that is going to evolve in the coming 10-20 years. In a way that removes those concerns, a study entitled “The Free Movement of Workers in the Context of Enlargement” which was published by the European Commission on 6 March 2001, it is pointed out that the impact of potential migration to member states in the long term would be limited to only 1 percent of the EU population.\(^3\) The overall economic impact in the host countries would have a small positive contribution to national product while there would be a negligible negative impact on unemployment for the citizens of the host countries.

Turkey's economic record shows that an annual per capita income growth of 4 percent is possible, which is currently about double that of the EU 15. However, there have been periods, especially in the 1990s, when crisis-ridden Turkey barely grew. During 2002-2003, when the prospects of obtaining a negotiation date for accession talks brightened, the Turkish economy once again demonstrated its potential for significant growth. As a small open economy plagued with debt, positive expectations and a road map are crucial for sustainable growth. In this respect, the EU is the only credible anchor for Turkey's concept of progress. In neo-classical theory, income disparity is the main economic determinant of migration. Keynesian analysis adds to this the unemployment gap. In empirical studies, both factors appear highly significant. Growth in the economy, particularly growth that exceeds population increase, reduces unemployment. However this relationship need not be very strong or very stable.

In Turkey, the open unemployment rate is about 11 percent. However, labour participation is only 50 percent. Furthermore, over 35 percent of the labour force is in the rural sector. The good news is that Turkey has a young population and the population growth rate has been steadily decreasing. The ratio of working adults to the total population is currently 65 percent. According to projections, this ratio will approach 70 percent in 2025 before starting to decline.

Robust and steady growth of the economy is necessary to make good use of this opportunity. The demography provides a major advantage for high growth. However, reducing unemployment also requires a smooth urbanisation process. The prerequisite is a stable political and macro environment where long-term structural reforms are implemented. Cohesion countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – have benefited from a “medium term growth bonus” upon entering the EU. These countries experienced return migration as a result of accession. It is highly unlikely that Turkey will receive the kind of structural and cohesion funds that these countries received. Nevertheless, given the impact that the mere prospect of getting a date for the negotiations is having, the positive impact of membership on growth and dynamism in Turkey can be expected to be very significant.

The impact of any postponement in the initiation of negotiations for accession, let alone the prospect of denied membership, could have a detrimental effect on Turkey's political stability and economy. Turkey may again become a source of immigration due to asylum, family reunification and irregular migration. Without the prospect of accession, immigration development of population, it is estimated that, with the assumption of Turkey's accession in 2010, a total of 2.7 million people would migrate to EU countries over a period of 15 years following accession. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, it is estimated that this figure would be 2.9 million over the next 15 years.

is more likely to increase in the short and medium term. Prospects of accession will not eliminate immigration from Turkey. Immigration will undoubtedly continue, but the context, the number and the composition of Turkish immigration will be very different than what it has been so far or what could be the case if Turkey were to be deprived of the prospect of EU membership. The new context would be one that would generate more employment prospects in Turkey. This would be accompanied by a long transition period for free movement of persons.

In the meantime, due to population decline and ageing, the EU will be experiencing labour shortages. More specifically, the proportion of working age adults to the general population will decline. The EU is responding to this development by trying to increase labour force participation, particularly among the elderly, but it is hard to imagine a scenario that does not use controlled migration as one of the policy solutions. It is true that immigration cannot be a permanent remedy for ageing – unless it is continual. However, while the socio-economic system in the EU adjusts to the reality of ageing, immigration can provide some relief and reduce adjustment costs. In this context, a balanced immigration where demand for migrant skills also plays a role is certainly preferable to irregular immigration and immigration through family reunions.

Lastly, the immigration literature and empirical studies tell us that people prefer to stay “put.” People prefer to stay where they are rather than move unless there are pressing economic, environmental or political pressures to move. In spite of the decision to create the Single Market and all the measures that have been adopted to encourage people within the EU to move, people still continue to prefer home. Similarly, as the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union were collapsing, there was great concern and panic that millions of Russians and East Europeans were going to flood Western Europe. It did not happen. What occurred, excluding refugee movements resulting from the violence in the former Yugoslavia, remained at manageable levels. In the end approximately 1.2 million mostly Germans and Jews emigrated in the first three years to Germany and Israel. Furthermore, most of the Russians (22-25 million) left outside of Russia in the Baltic States and former Soviet Republics by and large stayed “put” too. Hence, barring an economic and political derailment scenario, Turks will overwhelmingly decide to stay “put” as well.

6.3. Integration of Turkish Immigrants in EU Countries

It would be wrong to make sweeping observations that Turkish immigrants fail to integrate across the board. Some do and some do not. It is much more important to understand the dynamics that bring about these outcomes rather than make simplistic observations attributing the problem to religion or “genetics.”

Integration is inevitably a two way process if not a four way one: one between the immigrant and the host government, one between the immigrant and the host society, one among immigrants themselves and finally one between the immigrants and the government and society of the country of origin. It would be healthier to take this kind of holistic approach rather than lay the responsibility of integration solely on the shoulders of the immigrants or for that matter the host government.

The notion of integration and inclusion versus assimilation needs to be better understood. Here many EU countries need to go through a painful process of readjusting their
conception of their national identities from one that emphasises a mythical national homogeneity and culture to one that is diverse and multi-cultural. The value of European integration allows for this and ironically it might be possible to argue that Turkish membership to the EU might help to erode a common tendency of many Europeans to see Turkey and the Turks as the “other.” This in turn might help the process of integrating those Turkish immigrants who are left behind.

Turkish membership in the EU may in itself have a positive effect on the integration of Turkish immigrants into their host societies. Turkish accession is going to be a process that is going to challenge established patterns of thinking about Turkey and Turks as the “other.” With the gradual construction of bridges between Turkey and Europe in all walks of life, many in Europe that have regarded Turkey as culturally, socially and politically different will slowly but surely revise their perceptions, prejudices and images of Turkey and Turks. This in turn is likely to help alleviate some of the alienation that Turkish immigrants experience. As the day-to-day discrimination is gradually replaced by a more balanced and less hostile environment, the so called “ghetto effect” on the immigrants will diminish. A Turkish immigrant observing this change and the gradual integration of the country of Turkey into Europe will be more forthcoming in terms of integration. The two processes are likely to feed on each other and gradually transform the current vicious cycle of mutual alienation to a beneficial process of mutual integration. Even if these processes are not all encompassing, a good portion of the host society and the immigrant community will be affected by it.

6.4. Turkey as an Immigration Country

A Turkey that is actively engaged by the EU for eventual membership is highly likely to emulate the experience of Spain, Portugal and Greece in respect to becoming an immigration country itself. In other words Turkey will attract some of the immigration that otherwise could be going to Western Europe. Actually, Turkey has always been an immigration country though it has received little recognition for it. Between 1923-1996, Turkey admitted more than 1.6 million immigrants mostly from the Balkans. Turkey has also not been recognised as a country of refuge. Between 1988-1999 Turkey extended temporary protection to more than 850,000 persons, including Albanians, Bosnians, Bulgarian Turks, Chechens, Iraqis, Kurds, Pomaks and Turkmens. In addition, the number of Iranians who have sought informal temporary protection in Turkey throughout the 1980s and even 1990s is unknown. Furthermore, in late 80s Turkey enabled hundreds of thousands of nationals from these countries to engage in petty trading (suitcase trade), by adopting a very liberal visa policy towards countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many of these people who able to cushion to a certain extent the tough economic consequences of the transition from command economies to liberal market economies. Had Turkey not played this role, it is just possible that these people would have been forced to migrate to Western Europe. Today Turkey continues to attract such petty trading as well as workers from countries ranging from Armenia to Russia entering the country to take up temporary “commuting” jobs.

Ironically, if Turkey does proceed down the path toward membership, it will have to increasingly think about how to integrate its own immigrants. Turkey is already in the process of becoming an immigrant country; however there has not yet been a debate about what it will mean to become an immigration country and the impact this will have on Turkish
national identity and laws that govern immigration into Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey will and is already receiving EU nationals for permanent residency in Turkey. This is going to have an impact on Turkey. One concrete manifestation of this is that Turkish authorities have granted the right to open a church for EU retirees in Alanya (Antalya) and have granted a work permit for its priest. On the other hand, during the run up to the local elections on March 28th, some permanent residents from EU countries in Marmaris complained, when asked by radio/TV stations, that they paid local taxes but did not have the right to vote locally. Furthermore, just as has been the case with Spain, Portugal and Greece it is likely that there will be more and more third and fourth generation Turkish immigrants from Europe that will come to seek employment and settlement. This is actually already happening in the domain of tourism and Turkish authorities need to adjust to this and possibly further encourage it.

7. Conclusion and Remarks on International Migration: Promoting Management and Integration

Parallel to the dramatic global changes that we have witnessed in political and economic spheres, international migration movements have been rapidly expanding world-wide, thus making up a new challenge for the world community to be addressed and managed. The management of international migration, as well as promoting integration, being very essential aspects in that regard, are of significant importance for the global peace, stability, and welfare. These factors are also vital for attaining a strong human rights culture in our world. This issue bears an additional significance for Turkey, mainly due to the high number of Turkish migrant workers residing in different parts of the world, first and foremost in the EU Member States and on the eve of starting membership negotiations with the EU.

The answer to the question of whether large numbers of Turkish nationals would actually flood the EU in case of accession needs to be taken out of populist rhetoric. There certainly will be a movement of people from Turkey to the EU. However, we need to understand much better the demographic and economic dynamics behind it as well as what the composition of that movement would be. It is a known fact that the increase of the elderly population in all European countries in the 2000s and the reduced participation of the young population in the labour markets will result in a considerable shortage of skilled personnel in the member states, where employment is concentrated in production involving the use of high technology. This is already an important problem, and will result in a considerable need for working population in Europe after 2010. Turkey, which has a young, dynamic and educated population, holds an important potential to fill the deficit of skilled labour for the EU in the coming period.

Considering that Turkey is currently a candidate country and the uncertainty over the free movement of persons during the negotiating process if negotiations are started and following eventual accession, it seems difficult to identify the possible amount of migration from Turkey to the EU. The length of the negotiating process, the attitude of the EU side on the free movement of persons during negotiations, the length of any transitional period concerning the free movement of persons after accession, and the development of the Turkish economy, Turkey’s social development and its rate of population growth in this process, are important elements that would shape possible migration from Turkey to the EU. Given the importance of the EU as an anchor in Turkish politics and for the economy, it
is quite likely that migration might be greater and of a more difficult sort if the prospects of membership is lost.

We should keep in mind that the very challenge of migration management is of complex international nature. Individual efforts in that regard will hardly bear effective results. Therefore it should be addressed by global co-operation and by efforts of us all with a spirit of burden sharing.

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